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On May 13, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.) issued a preliminary injunction in L.C. et al. v. Trump (L.C. v. Trump), suspending sanctions enforcement against Francesca Albanese, a United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights. The case has become a landmark example of challenging OFAC sanctions in court: the court blocked enforcement of a decision by the U.S. Department of State and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (OFAC), notwithstanding the executive branch’s objections grounded in national security and foreign policy. We analyze how this outcome was achieved and what it means for sanctions litigation practice.
Executive Order 14203 and the ICC Sanctions Program
On February 6, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order No. 14203, “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court” (ICC). The legal authority for the order was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The order provides for the imposition of sanctions on foreign persons who directly engaged in the ICC’s efforts to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute U.S. nationals or nationals of U.S. allies without the consent of those nations.
Within this sanctions program, on July 1, 2025, OFAC registered the ICC Sanctions Regulations, codifying the regime in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The order is the direct successor to Executive Order No. 13928, issued during Trump’s first presidential term in 2020 and revoked by the Biden administration in 2021. The current version features a broader set of designation grounds and an explicit reference to ICC actions targeting Israeli officials.
Albanese’s SDN Designation: Timeline and Consequences
On July 9, 2025, the U.S. Department of State announced the designation of Francesca Albanese, an Italian national serving as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List under Executive Order No. 14203.
The practical consequences of the SDN designation were immediate. Albanese lost access to her bank account, became ineligible to receive payments from U.S. persons (including fees and publishing royalties), and faced restrictions on travel to the United States, where her family, including her U.S. citizen daughter, resides. The designation placed Albanese’s husband and daughter in an acutely difficult position: any financial transaction benefiting a blocked person risked sanctions liability.
The L.C. v. Trump Lawsuit: Plaintiffs and Legal Theories
On February 25, 2026, Massimiliano Cali (Albanese’s husband) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.), on behalf of himself, his wife, and their minor U.S. citizen daughter. Defendants included President Trump, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, and the U.S. Department of Justice.
The complaint rested on three independent legal theories.
The first was a First Amendment violation. Plaintiffs characterized Albanese’s professional activity as “core First Amendment activity” and argued that the SDN designation constituted government retaliation targeting the specific content of her speech and recommendations. Their position was that the sanctions were imposed not under the objective legal criteria of IEEPA or Executive Order No. 14203, but solely in response to views she expressed, views with which the executive branch disagreed.
The second was a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The blocking of property without adequate notice and without an opportunity to be heard prior to the sanctions decision violated constitutional due process guarantees and protections against arbitrary deprivation of property.
The third was an ultra vires claim. Plaintiffs argued that IEEPA does not authorize the executive branch to impose sanctions solely based on speech or informational activity, conduct that, in their view, falls squarely within the statutory exemptions outlined in the text of IEEPA itself (50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)).
The U.S. Department of State characterized the lawsuit as “baseless lawfare” and maintained that the sanctions were “lawful and appropriate.” Defendants also argued that the court should exercise judicial deference on matters touching national security and foreign policy.
The Court’s May 13, 2026 Ruling: Preliminary Injunction
U.S. District Judge Richard Leon, appointed to the bench by President George W. Bush, issued a preliminary injunction directing the U.S. Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, OFAC, and the Department of Justice to refrain from enforcing and implementing the sanctions decision against Albanese for the duration of the litigation. The court set out its reasoning in a 26-page memorandum opinion.
The court’s central holding was as follows: “If Albanese had instead spoken out against the ICC’s actions targeting U.S. and Israeli nationals, she would not have been placed on the SDN List under Executive Order No. 14203. The effect of Albanese’s designation is therefore to ‘punish’ and thereby ‘suppress disfavored speech.’”
The court also found that Albanese, notwithstanding her status as a foreign national permanently residing abroad, could invoke First Amendment protections because she possesses sufficient “substantial connections to the United States,” including by virtue of her family residing in the country and her property interests there.
The preliminary injunction is not a final judgment on the merits. The litigation continues; the injunction may be reversed on appeal or following a full merits review. Even so, its issuance immediately lifted most of the practical restrictions on Albanese: access to her bank account, the ability to receive payments from U.S. persons, and entry to the United States were all restored.
Legal Analysis: Why This Decision Matters
This ruling carries significance well beyond the individual case. For the practice of challenging OFAC sanctions in court, it establishes or confirms several important principles.
Foreign nationals may invoke the First Amendment if they have substantial connections to the United States. This meaningfully expands the pool of potential plaintiffs on constitutional grounds. As applied to Russian SDN designees with assets, family members, or business ties in the United States, this conclusion retains direct practical relevance.
The viewpoint discrimination standard applies to sanctions decisions. Where a designation is imposed not based on objective legal criteria – support for terrorism, violation of law, and the like – but based on the executive branch’s disagreement with a person’s particular views or expressive conduct, such a decision will, in all likelihood, not survive constitutional scrutiny.
National security invocations do not automatically foreclose judicial review. The court substantively examined the case notwithstanding arguments for judicial deference on foreign policy grounds. This aligns with the trend D.D.C. has consistently demonstrated in sanctions litigation.
A multifaceted legal strategy outperforms reliance on a single ground. The complaint in this case combined constitutional arguments (First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments), an administrative law basis under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and an ultra vires claim under IEEPA. This approach creates several independent legal bases, each capable of sustaining judicial relief in its own right.
Why D.D.C. Is the Primary Forum for Challenging OFAC Sanctions
L.C. v. Trump is one more confirmation of a durable pattern: challenging OFAC sanctions in court gravitates toward the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and for sound reasons.
Territorial jurisdiction. OFAC is located in Washington, D.C., which establishes proper venue over the defendant under federal procedural law.
A deeper body of precedent. D.D.C. has developed the most robust case law in OFAC litigation. It is here that the procedural standards for challenging OFAC decisions under the APA, on ultra vires grounds, and on constitutional grounds have been most fully elaborated.
Willingness to engage preliminary injunction motions. The court has consistently declined to take a formalistic or evasive approach, rigorously examining the substance of sanctions disputes at the preliminary injunction stage, including the constitutionality of executive branch decisions.
A track record of litigation-driven delisting. Recent cases, including Zadornov (suit filed July 2024, delisting April 2026) and Buriko (suit filed December 2024, delisting December 2025) – demonstrate clearly that filing suit in D.D.C. either triggers administrative delisting or substantially accelerates it.
This makes D.D.C. not merely one possible forum among many, but the most effective judicial tool available to parties challenging OFAC decisions. Challenging OFAC sanctions in court in other federal circuits is possible in limited circumstances, but D.D.C. offers the most predictable procedural environment and the richest body of precedent for such matters.
Conclusion
L.C. v. Trump is not an exception; it is a natural result. It demonstrates that challenging OFAC sanctions in court – in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia is a functional tool: the court issues injunctive relief, substantively reviews the constitutionality of sanctions decisions, and does not deflect that review by invoking the political sensitivity of the case.
For persons on OFAC’s SDN List, or those whose assets have been blocked in connection with U.S. sanctions, this ruling provides an important practical benchmark. Legal tools exist, and when properly deployed, they produce meaningful results. Their use, however, requires timely action, particularly in light of the six-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)) applicable to suits against the federal government.
Fesenko, P.C. Law Offices focuses on representing Russian-speaking clients in challenging OFAC decisions, both administratively and in U.S. federal court, including D.D.C. Contact us to learn what we can do for you.



